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Abstract: This paper aims to analyze the factors that determine the value of mahr 
in Muslim societies. The analysis is based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with pooled cross-section data from the last three waves of the 
Indonesian Family Life Surveys (IFLS). The main finding is that socioeconomic status 
in the forms of groom’s ownership of assets and education level matters most for 
the value of mahr. This finding holds for regression with full sample as well as 
subsamples, i.e. couples whose groom is Javanese, couples whose groom is non-
Javanese, couples whose bride is Javanese and couples whose bride is non-
Javanese. Socioeconomic status in the form of bride’s education level also matters 
for the value of mahr with some exceptions. The other finding is that perceived 
probability of divorce as represented by differences in the socioeconomic status of 
a marrying couple do not have a significant effect on the value of mahr. The effect 
of physical appearances in the form of bride’s height is at best not robust and 
subject to the sample or subsample included. These findings can be useful as a 
reference to make marriage decisions in the future or to evaluate the ongoing 
practices for possible reforms. 
Keywords: Mahr; Marriage; Muslim; IFLS 
JEL Classification: J12; N30 
Introduction 
Mahr –the handing of money or other kind of properties from a groom to a 
bride– is a legal condition of marriage in Islam, at least as agreed by most 
Muslim scholars. There remain different views on whether a marriage 
without a mahr is valid, but it is clear that the mahr is obligatory based on 
the primary sources of Islam (the Quran and the Sunnah) (Maghniyyah, 
1997; But & Muhametov, 2013; Siddiqui, 1995; Wani, 2001). 
Despite this imposition, there were no specific guidelines on how much the 
value of mahr should be. It is only mentioned that a proper value of mahr 
is one that is affordable and not burdensome. To cite the words of the 
Prophet Muhammad, "The best of mahr is the least one (or the most 
affordable one)” (as narrated by Abu Dawud and Al-Hakim, see e.g. Saheeh 
al-Jaami’, 3279). 
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In the absence of such specific guidelines, Muslim scholars have come with different 
opinions about the value of mahr. For example, interpreting one of the ayah in the Quran, 
An Nisa’: 20, (Alu Syaikh et al., 2018) put an emphasis on the permissibility of awarding a 
big amount of mahr. Commenting on the same ayah in the Quran, (As-siba’i, 1999) states 
that a mahr should be given in a valuable form as it symbolizes the highness of marriage. 
Scholars of the Hanafi school set the minimum amount of mahr at 10 silver dirhams 
(equivalent to 33.6 grams of silver or 4.8 grams of gold), while those of the Maliki school 
limit the minimum value of mahr to 3 silver dirhams. To them, a mahr less than the 
minimum value is unacceptable, even if it was agreed upon. Scholars of the Shafii and 
Hambali schools do not see any strong arguments to limit the minimum value of mahr and 
opt to leave the decision to grooms and brides (Maghniyyah, 1997; But & Muhametov, 
2013). 
 
In practice, the value of mahr has varied significantly across different individuals and 
societies (Afzal et al., 1973; Aini, 2014; Korson, 1968). History and regulation have, to 
some extent, played a role in the determination of the value of mahr (Abd Wakil & Ahmad, 
2017; Azahari & Ali, 2015). However, other factors may have also been relevant. For 
example, it has been found that the average value of mahr is higher in urban areas than 
in rural areas (Habibi, 1997) and in high socioeconomic areas than in middle and low socio-
economic areas (Afzal et al., 1973; Korson, 1968). 
 
Remarkably, despite the long historical practice of mahr in Muslim society, there is only 
limited number of studies examining the value of mahr and its determinants (Afzal et al., 
1973; Aini, 2014; Habibi, 1997; Korson, 1968; Kurniawan, 2019). Most of these studies are 
descriptive (Habibi, 1997 and Kurniawan, 2019, are perhaps an exception). The majority 
of the works in the past focus on the Islamic rulings on mahr (Azzam et al., 2011; Danyal, 
2015; Ghazali, 2008; Maghniyyah, 1997; Rahman, 1970; Ridha, 1975; Siddiqui, 1995; 
Syafqat, 1979). A number of works look at the legal rulings on mahr in certain countries 
(El Alami & Hinchcliffe, 1996; Mehdi, 2001; Wani, 2001), while several others discuss mahr 
from sociocultural or sociopolitical contexts (e.g. Abd Wakil & Ahmad, 2017; Azahari & Ali, 
2015; Ishak, 1983; Korson, 1968; Mehdi, 2001; Wynn, 2008; Yassari, 2013). Empirical 
analyses on mahr have been dominated by studies using anthropological methods to 
describe how mahr is practiced in a specific Muslim society (Moors, 1994; Nurcahyono, 
2020; Sahay & Sahay, 1996; Tugby, 1959). 
 
It should be noted that the term mahr in Islamic context is different from another term 
that is often mistakenly used as its English translation, dowry. Mahr –sometimes also 
called mehr, mehir, mehrieh, mahriyeh, maskahwin or maskawin– is something that a 
bride is entitled to receive from her groom on marriage. Mahr serves as a form of gifts to 
express love and affection. It also serves as a form of savings that can be used for a bride's 
own benefit, to help build her family or to provide herself with some degree of economic 
security in the event of future marital dissolution due to her husband’s death or divorce 
(Azahari & Ali, 2015; Korson, 1968; Ridha, 1975; Singh, 2010). By contrast, dowry is money 
or other kind of properties that a bride and her family bring forth to the marriage. It is 
paid by a bride and her family to a groom and his family rather than the other way around. 
The term mahr is closer to the term dower in a sense that the direction of the payment is 
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from a groom to a bride (Habibi, 1997). However, mahr is obligatory and needs to be 
specified at the time of marriages (regardless of whether the payment is made 
immediately or deferred), while dower is optional and not paid until the death of the 
husband. The term mahr is also different from bride price. The later refers to money or 
other kind of properties paid by a groom and his family to the parents of a bride upon 
marriage (Korson, 1968). Rather than the bride herself, it is her family that is entitled to 
receive the payment.  
 
The current paper aims to analyze the factors that determine the value of mahr in the 
marriage of Muslims. The question to be answered in this paper is whether the 
socioeconomic status of a groom and a bride, differences in the socioeconomic status of 
a groom and a bride, and the physical appearances of a marrying couple have a significant 
effect on the value of mahr. This paper focuses particularly on the case of Muslims in 
Indonesia.  
 
This paper extends the works by Habibi (1997) which focuses on the case of marriages in 
Iran and the work by Kurniawan (2020) which focuses only on the case of marriages in 
eastern Indonesia. Within the empirical literature of mahr in general, this paper 
complements the previous works examining the value of mahr (Afzal et al., 1973; Aini, 
2014; Korson, 1968) or describing how mahr is practiced in a specific Muslim society 
(Moors, 1994; Nurcahyono, 2020; Sahay & Sahay, 1996; Tugby, 1959). 
 
Theoretically, the determination of the value of mahr can be explained using the 
economic theory of price. The value of mahr can be seen as a price affected by the 
demand from a bride and the offer (i.e. the supply) that comes from a groom. 
 
To follow Habibi (1997), the value of mahr can also be seen as a result of a prenuptial 
negotiation between the parental families of a marrying couple. The key assumption is 
that the value of mahr demanded by a bride’s family revolves around two concerns. First, 
perception of the risk of marital instability (i.e. the probability of divorce in the future). 
Since mahr is expected to provide a bride with some degree of economic security in the 
event of marital dissolution (Azahari & Ali, 2015; Korson, 1968; Ridha, 1975; Singh, 2010), 
the higher the perceived risk of marital instability, the higher is the value of mahr 
demanded. From a different point of view, the higher the value of mahr, the less likely is 
the husband to unilaterally ask for a divorce in the future. Second, the view that mahr is 
a status symbol. Since mahr represents status, the higher the socioeconomic status of a 
bride, the higher is the value of mahr demanded.  
 
Going by the above assumption, Habibi (1997) expects that from a bride's perspective, 
the value of mahr to be demanded is represented by the formula 
 
𝑀𝑑 = (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠, 𝑃𝑏) 
 
where 𝑀𝑑  is the value of mahr to be demanded, 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 is the socioeconomic status of 
the bride and 𝑃𝑏 is the probability of future divorce as perceived by the bride’s family. 
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From a groom’s perspective, it is also assumed by Habibi (1997) that the value of mahr 
revolves around the concerns on marital stability and the importance of mahr as a status 
symbol. In general, the higher the probability of divorce in the future, the lower is the 
value of mahr to be offered. The idea is that the groom wishes to reduce his material 
losses from future marital dissolution settlement. With respect to socioeconomic status, 
the groom considers both his own economic status and the socioeconomic status of his 
bride. For him and his family, the value of mahr to be offered is therefore represented by 
the formula 
 
𝑀𝑠 = 𝑀𝑠(𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑒′𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚′𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠, 𝑃𝑔) 
 
where 𝑀𝑠 is the value of mahr to be offered, 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑒′𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 is the socioeconomic status 
of the bride, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚′𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 is the socioeconomic status of the groom, and 𝑃𝑔  is the 
probability of future divorce as perceived by the groom’s family.  
 
Theoretically, agreements on the value of mahr take place only if the value demanded by 
a bride’s family is lower than the value offered by a groom’s family. In other words, 
agreements on the value of mahr can occur only if 
 
𝑀𝑑 < 𝑀 < 𝑀𝑠 (3) 
 
where 𝑀 is the value of mahr agreed by the parental families of a groom and a bride. 
 
Based on his model, Habibi (1997) comes to a hypothesis that the determinants of the 
value of mahr include three categories of socioeconomic variables, namely variables 
that affect the value of mahr demanded, variables that affect the value of mahr offered, 
and variables that affect the perceived probability of divorce in the future. 
Socioeconomic variables which affect the value of mahr demanded by a bride’s family 
may include ownership of assets, income, employment status, education level, age and 
ethnicity. The same variables may also affect the value of mahr offered by the family of 
a groom.  
 
The effects that ownership of assets and income have on the value of mahr are likely 
positive (Anderson, 2000; Murat, 2013). The effect of employment status is likely also 
positive (Dasog, 1998), similar with the effect of education level (Ashraf et al., 2018; 
Chowdhury, 2008; Dalmia & Lawrence, 2005; Lowes & Nunn, 2017). The higher the level 
of education of a groom or a bride, the higher is the value of mahr. The effect of age on 
the value of mahr is ambiguous (Chowdhury, 2008; Dalmia & Lawrence, 2005). Likewise, 
the effect that ethnicity has on the value of mahr is ambiguous. Ethnicity can have a 
positive or negative relationship, depending on the details of each ethnic (Anderson, 
2000; Chowdhury, 2008). 
 
Empirically, it is not easy to measure the perceived probability of divorce in the future. 
Habibi (1997) uses kinship and geographic proximity between parental families as a proxy 
for such perceived probability. The idea is that the closer kinship and geographic proximity 
between a marrying couple’s parental families, the lower is the risk of marital instability 
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and the perceived probability of divorce in the future. In the current paper, rather than 
kinship and geographic proximity between parental families, it is differences in the 





To analyze the factors that determine the value of mahr in Muslim societies, this paper 
uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with pooled cross-section data. The data 
are taken from the last three waves of the Indonesian Family Life Surveys (IFLS) that were 
conducted in the years 1999-2000, 2007-2008 and 2014-2015. These surveys as a whole 
represent around 83 percent of the Indonesian population and include more than 30 
thousand individuals who live in 13 out of 34 provinces of the country (Strauss et al., 2016; 
Strauss et al., 2004, Strauss et al., 2009). 
 
The unit of analysis in this paper is groom-and-bride couples. To be included in the sample, 
the couples must be Muslim (at least formally) and getting married for the first time in 
the year of surveys or in the year preceding the surveys. These criteria help reduce 
potential ambiguities due to differences in the contextual gist of mahr across different 
religions or across first, second, third and fourth marriages.  
 
The variable to be explained in this paper refers to the natural logarithm of the value of 
mahr deflated by the consumer price index (CPI). It originates from the answers given by 
male respondents (i.e. grooms) to the question, “What was the value of the mahr of your 
current/most recent marriage at the time of the marriage?” in the IFLS’ questionnaires. 
 
In line with the theoretical exposition in the previous section, the main explanatory 
variables in this paper consist of the socioeconomic status of a groom and a bride and 
differences in the socioeconomic status of a groom and a bride. In addition, the 
explanatory variables in this paper include the physical appearances of a marrying couple, 
assuming that physical attractiveness matter for the value of mahr. The socioeconomic 
status of a groom and a bride include ownership of assets, income, employment status, 
level of education, age and ethnicity. Ownership of assets is defined as the total value of 
assets in rupiah, while income is defined as the total rupiah generated over the past year. 
Both asset ownership and income are deflated by the CPI and transformed into their 
natural logarithm form. Due to the prevalence of missing values, only asset ownership 
and income that belong to a groom are included in the analysis. Asset ownership and 
income that belong to a bride are excluded from the analysis. Employment status is 
represented by a dummy variable, taking the value 1 for employed and 0 otherwise. Level 
of education is defined as the number of years spent by a groom or a bride in formal 
education. Age refers to the age of a groom and a bride at the time of marriage. Ethnicity 
is represented by a dummy for Jawa, taking the value 1 if a groom or a bride is of Javanese 
ethnicity and 0 otherwise. Differences in the socioeconomic status of a groom and bride 
include education difference, age difference and ethnic difference. Education difference 
is measured as the years spent in formal education by a groom minus the years spent in 
formal education by a bride. Age difference is measured as the age of a groom minus the 
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age of a bride. Ethnic difference is represented by a dummy variable, whose value equals 
1 if a groom-and-bride couple is of different ethnic and 0 otherwise. Physical appearances 
include a measure of height and a dummy for body proportionality. The dummy for body 
proportionality is based on the concept of body mass index (BMI) –an index of weight-for-
height introduced by the World Health Organization (WHO). The dummy for body 
proportionality is valued 1 if a groom or a bride is normal and 0 otherwise (i.e. 
underweight, overweight or obesity). 
 
To take into account the effect of the years of surveys (and, thus, also the years of 
marriage), a few dummies for marriage years are included in the analysis. To avoid perfect 
collinearity, the dummy for year 1999 is left out and treated as a reference category.  
 
The regression equation is provided by: 
 

















+ 𝜀𝑖  
 
where 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖) denotes the natural logarithm of CPI-deflated value of mahr, 𝑋1 denotes a 
vector of the socioeconomic status of a groom and a bride, 𝑍𝑖  denotes a vector of 
differences in the socioeconomic status of a groom and a bride, 𝑃𝑖 denotes a vector of the 
physical appearances of a groom and a bride and 𝑌𝑖  denotes a vector of marriage year 
dummies. The alphabet 𝜀𝑖  denotes error terms. 
 
Estimations are carried out for regression with full sample and regression with 
subsamples. The later consist of regression with a subsample of couples whose groom 
belongs to Javanese ethnicity, regression with a subsample of couples whose groom 
belongs to non-Javanese ethnicity, regression with a subsample of couples whose bride 
belongs to Javanese ethnicity and regression with a subsample of couples whose bride 
belongs to non-Javanese ethnicity. 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. The (CPI deflated) value of mahr is very widely 
distributed, with an average of IDR 2,025,900 and a standard deviation of IDR 5,306,741. 
Preliminary evaluation indicates that the difference in the employment status of a groom 
and a bride is highly correlated with one or more of the other explanatory variables. This 
variable is therefore excluded from further analysis. Table 2 reports the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) and the tolerance values of the main explanatory variables after such 
exclusion. It can be seen that no VIF value exceeds 5.00 and no tolerance value is less than 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mahr_Original value in rupiah 2,025,900 5,306,741 11,880 72,050,000 
Mahr_Value in natural log 13.111 1.713 9.383 18.093 
Groom_Ownership of assets 15.140 1.515 9.952 20.294 
Groom_Income 15.704 1.143 9.424 18.270 
Groom_Employment status 0.941 0.237 0.000 1.000 
Groom_Education level 10.421 3.407 0.000 18.000 
Groom_Age 25.941 4.150 15.000 40.000 
Groom_Javanese 0.459 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Groom_Sundanese 0.125 0.331 0.000 1.000 
Groom_Betawi 0.055 0.228 0.000 1.000 
Groom_Body proportionality 1.018 0.645 0.000 3.000 
Groom_Height 164.041 5.935 142.500 184.300 
Bride_Employment status 0.290 0.454 0.000 1.000 
Bride_Education level 10.703 3.309 0.000 18.000 
Bride_Age 22.770 4.140 15.000 39.000 
Bride_Javanese 0.471 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Bride_Sundanese 0.126 0.333 0.000 1.000 
Bride_Betawi 0.044 0.206 0.000 1.000 
Bride_Body proportionality 1.110 0.691 0.000 3.000 
Bride_Height 151.686 5.324 125.300 170.500 
Difference in employment status 0.664 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Difference in education level 2.107 2.183 0.000 13.000 
Difference in age 3.908 3.212 0.000 20.000 
Difference in ethnicity 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 2 VIF and tolerance values 
 VIF values Tolerance values 
 (1) (2) 
Groom_Ownership of assets 1.330 0.754 
Groom_Income 1.360 0.738 
Groom_Employment status 1.030 0.968 
Groom_Education level 1.720 0.583 
Groom_Age 4.180 0.239 
Groom_Javanese 4.260 0.235 
Groom_Sundanese 3.110 0.321 
Groom_Betawi 2.450 0.407 
Groom_Body proportionality 1.080 0.928 
Groom_Height 1.150 0.868 
Bride_Employment status 1.110 0.900 
Bride_Education level 1.880 0.532 
Bride_Age 3.160 0.316 
Bride_Javanese 4.190 0.239 
Bride_Sundanese 3.100 0.323 
Bride_Betawi 2.370 0.422 
Bride_Body proportionality 1.080 0.925 
Bride_Height 1.070 0.935 
Difference in education level 1.090 0.918 
Difference in employment status 
a) 
  
Difference in age 3.070 0.326 
Difference in ethnicity 1.100 0.911 
Note: a) Difference in employment status is excluded from the analysis due to possible collinearity. The 
values reported are VIF and tolerance values computed after such exclusion.  
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Basic Regression Results 
 
Table 3 reports the results from the OLS regression with full sample.  
 
Table 3 Results from regression with full sample 
 Full sample    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Groom_Ownership of assets 0.187*** 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Groom_Income -0.030 -0.033 -0.039 -0.041 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
Groom_Employment status -0.039 -0.027 -0.028 -0.017 
 (0.239) (0.234) (0.240) (0.236) 
Groom_Education level 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.085*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Groom_Age 0.003 -0.013 0.000 -0.017 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025) 
Groom_Javanese 0.128 0.140 0.113 0.123 
 (0.194) (0.198) (0.193) (0.198) 
Groom_Sundanese 0.528** 0.518** 0.510** 0.500** 
 (0.220) (0.222) (0.221) (0.223) 
Groom_Betawi 1.102*** 1.035*** 1.130*** 1.067*** 
 (0.280) (0.282) (0.281) (0.282) 
Groom_Body proportionality 0.090 0.095 0.091 0.096 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.083) 
Groom_Height -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bride_Employment status 0.108 0.104 0.096 0.092 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) 
Bride_Education level 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Bride_Age 0.006 0.020 0.008 0.022 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.023) 
Bride_Javanese -0.455** -0.460** -0.463** -0.468** 
 (0.191) (0.195) (0.191) (0.195) 
Bride_Sundanese -0.286 -0.305 -0.276 -0.295 
 (0.228) (0.230) (0.230) (0.231) 
Bride_Betawi -0.177 -0.138 -0.227 -0.191 
 (0.318) (0.314) (0.318) (0.315) 
Bride_Body proportionality   0.064 0.060 
   (0.075) (0.075) 
Bride_Height   0.023** 0.023** 
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Difference in education level  -0.028  -0.029 
  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Difference in age  0.024  0.025 
  (0.029)  (0.028) 
Difference in ethnicity  0.183  0.168 
  (0.139)  (0.139) 
N-observations 925 925 925 925 
R-squared 0.217 0.221 0.223 0.226 
Note: The explained variable is the natural logarithm of the value of mahr. Each regression includes a 
constant and year of marriage dummies. The values in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level. 
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In column 1, the regression includes a constant, the socioeconomic status of a groom and 
a bride, and year of marriage dummies. In column 2, differences in the socioeconomic 
status of each groom-and-bride couple are added into the regression. In column 3, 
measures of physical appearances instead of differences in the socioeconomic status of a 
marrying couple are included in the regression. In column 4, the regression includes all of 
the explanatory variables together. Irrespective of the explanatory variables included, the 
coefficients of groom’s ownership of assets and groom’s education level are positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of bride’s education level is also positive 
and significant at the 1 percent level, signifying the importance of such variable for the 
value of mahr. The coefficients of groom’s income, groom’s and bride’s employment 
status, and groom’s and bride’s age are not statistically significant.  
 
The coefficients of the dummy for Sundanese groom and the dummy for Betawi groom 
are both positive and significant at least at the 5 percent level. By contrast, the coefficient 
of the dummy for Javanese bride is significantly negative at the 5 percent level.  
 
The effects that differences in the socioeconomic status of a marrying couple have on the 
value of mahr are statistically negligible. None of the coefficients of difference in 
education level, difference in age and difference in ethnicity are significant. 
 
Physical appearances in the form of bride’s height have a positive and significant effect 
on the value of mahr. Physical appearances in the form of groom’s height, groom’s body 
proportionality dan bride’s body proportionality do, however, not seem to be important 
for the value of mahr as their coefficients are not statistically significant.  
 
Table 4 reports the results from the OLS regression with subsamples of couples whose 
groom belongs to Javanese ethnicity and couples whose groom belongs to non-Javanese 
ethnicity. In columns 1 and 3, the regression includes a constant, the socioeconomic status 
of a groom and a bride, measures of physical appearances of a groom and a bride, and 
year of marriage dummies. In columns 2 and 4, differences in the socioeconomic status of 
each groom-and-bride couple are added into the regression, allowing the natural 
logarithm of the value of mahr to be regressed on all of the explanatory variables 
together. The coefficients of groom’s ownership of assets, groom’s education level, and 
bride’s education level are positive and significant at least at the 10 percent level. The 
coefficients of the dummy for Sundanese groom and the dummy for Betawi groom are 
also positive and significant in columns 3-4, implying the presence of a difference in the 
value of mahr paid by grooms across non-Javanese ethnicities. The coefficient of the 
dummy for Betawi bride is significantly positive in columns 1-2, but negative in columns 
3-4. This infers that the effect of a bride’s ethnicity on the value of mahr depends on the 
whether her groom is of Javanese or non-Javanese ethnicity. The coefficient of bride’s 
height is positive and significant in the last columns, implying the importance of this 
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Table 4 Results from regression with subsamples 
 Javanese groom Non-Javanese groom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Groom_Ownership of assets 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.209*** 0.203*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) 
Groom_Income 0.010 -0.004 -0.110 -0.100 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.094) (0.094) 
Groom_Employment status -0.066 -0.067 0.026 0.056 
 (0.317) (0.313) (0.367) (0.348) 
Groom_Education level 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.089*** 0.093*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Groom_Age 0.020 0.052* -0.025 -0.115*** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.024) (0.039) 
Groom_Sundanese   0.661*** 0.692*** 
   (0.235) (0.236) 
Groom_Betawi   1.455*** 1.488*** 
   (0.291) (0.296) 
Groom_Body proportionality -0.092 -0.099 0.252** 0.246** 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.116) (0.115) 
Groom_Height -0.004 -0.004 -0.014 -0.017 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Bride_Employment status 0.234 0.214 -0.019 -0.031 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.175) (0.176) 
Bride_Education level 0.054* 0.050* 0.071** 0.085** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) 
Bride_Age -0.007 -0.025 0.023 0.089** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.035) 
Bride_Javanese -0.118 -0.113 -0.617** -0.612** 
 (0.297) (0.297) (0.251) (0.256) 
Bride_Sundanese 0.042 -0.008 -0.419* -0.425* 
 (0.651) (0.642) (0.249) (0.249) 
Bride_Betawi 1.704*** 1.700*** -0.615* -0.657* 
 (0.350) (0.348) (0.348) (0.350) 
Bride_Body proportionality 0.106 0.111 0.010 0.015 
 (0.095) (0.096) (0.113) (0.111) 
Bride_Height -0.008 -0.007 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Difference in education level  -0.057*  0.000 
  (0.033)  (0.037) 
Difference in age  -0.045  0.119*** 
  (0.031)  (0.043) 
N-observations 425 425 500 500 
R-squared 0.209 0.218 0.244 0.256 
Note: The explained variable is the natural logarithm of the value of mahr. Each regression includes a 
constant and year of marriage dummies. The values in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level. 
 
Table 5 reports the results from the OLS regression with subsamples of couples whose 
bride is Javanese and couples whose bride is non-Javanese. In columns 1 and 3, again, the 
regression includes a constant, the socioeconomic status of a groom and a bride, the 
physical appearances of a groom and a bride, and year of marriage dummies. In columns 
2 and 4, the differences in the socioeconomic status of a groom and a bride are also 
included in the regression. The coefficients of groom’s ownership of assets and groom’s 
education level are again positive and significant. The coefficient of bride’s education level 
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is positive, but statistically significant only in columns 3-4. Holding other variables 
constant, bride’s education level matters for the value of mahr only when the bride is of 
non-Javanese ethnicity. The coefficient of the dummy for Betawi groom is significantly 
positive. The coefficient of bride’s height is again positive and significant in columns 3-4, 
implying the importance of this variable across couples with a non-Javanese bride. 
 
Table 5 Results from regression with subsamples 
 Javanese bride Non-Javanese bride 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Groom_Ownership of assets 0.111** 0.114** 0.245*** 0.236*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.060) 
Groom_Income -0.001 -0.014 -0.100 -0.086 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.096) (0.096) 
Groom_Employment status -0.079 -0.065 0.090 0.142 
 (0.295) (0.290) (0.424) (0.394) 
Groom_Education level 0.095*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
Groom_Age 0.015 0.046* -0.014 -0.107** 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.042) 
Groom_Javanese 0.324 0.340 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.324) (0.320) (0.280) (0.282) 
Groom_Sundanese 0.724* 0.699* 0.430 0.440 
 (0.423) (0.420) (0.269) (0.272) 
Groom_Betawi 1.642*** 1.648*** 1.007*** 0.989*** 
 (0.625) (0.601) (0.293) (0.296) 
Groom_Body proportionality 0.039 0.028 0.138 0.131 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.116) (0.115) 
Groom_Height -0.003 -0.001 -0.013 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Bride_Employment status 0.097 0.071 0.047 0.036 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.181) (0.181) 
Bride_Education level 0.032 0.026 0.091*** 0.105*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) 
Bride_Age 0.010 -0.007 0.003 0.073* 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.038) 
Bride_Sundanese   -0.181 -0.163 
   (0.261) (0.264) 
Bride_Betawi   -0.112 -0.109 
   (0.323) (0.324) 
Bride_Body proportionality 0.123 0.133 0.006 0.013 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.116) (0.115) 
Bride_Height 0.001 0.001 0.037*** 0.039*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Difference in education level  -0.068**  0.004 
  (0.033)  (0.037) 
Difference in age  -0.043  0.125*** 
  (0.030)  (0.046) 
N-observations 436 436 489 489 
R-squared 0.193 0.204 0.250 0.263 
Note: The explained variable is the natural logarithm of the value of mahr. Each regression includes a 
constant and year of marriage dummies. The values in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level. 
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Results from Robustness Tests 
 
The above estimations include groom’s income, groom’s employment status and bride’s 
employment status whose coefficients never turn out to be statistically significant. This 
may cause model overfitting and mislead the results. To deal with such concern, 
estimations in Table 3 are repeated without the aforementioned three variables.  
 
Table 6 Results from robustness tests 
 Full sample    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Groom_Ownership of assets 0.183*** 0.176*** 0.179*** 0.173*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Groom_Education level 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Groom_Age 0.002 -0.001 -0.015 -0.019 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) 
Groom_Javanese 0.134 0.119 0.145 0.128 
 (0.193) (0.192) (0.197) (0.196) 
Groom_Sundanese 0.531** 0.510** 0.520** 0.500** 
 (0.217) (0.217) (0.220) (0.220) 
Groom_Betawi 1.101*** 1.123*** 1.033*** 1.060*** 
 (0.278) (0.278) (0.280) (0.280) 
Groom_Body proportionality 0.086 0.086 0.090 0.090 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) 
Groom_Height -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bride_Education level 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Bride_Age 0.008 0.010 0.022 0.024 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) 
Bride_Javanese -0.453** -0.461** -0.458** -0.466** 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.194) (0.193) 
Bride_Sundanese -0.286 -0.276 -0.305 -0.295 
 (0.226) (0.227) (0.228) (0.228) 
Bride_Betawi -0.193 -0.244 -0.156 -0.208 
 (0.314) (0.314) (0.310) (0.311) 
Bride_Body proportionality  0.064  0.060 
  (0.074)  (0.075) 
Bride_Height  0.023**  0.023** 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Difference in education level   -0.028 -0.029 
   (0.024) (0.024) 
Difference in age   0.025 0.026 
   (0.029) (0.028) 
Difference in ethnicity   0.180 0.163 
   (0.137) (0.136) 
N-observations 925 925 925 925 
R-squared 0.216 0.222 0.220 0.225 
Note: The explained variable is the natural logarithm of the value of mahr. Each regression includes a 
constant and year of marriage dummies. The values in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level. 
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The results are reported in Table 6. The coefficients of groom’s ownership of assets, 
groom’s education level, and bride’s education level remain statistically significant. The 
coefficients of the dummy for Sundanese groom, the dummy for Betawi groom and the 
dummy for Javanese bride also remain significant. The coefficient of bride’s height does 
not qualitatively change and remain significantly positive at the 5 percent level.  
 
Further tests suggest that the results in Table 3-5 are robust. Due to space restrictions, 





The fact that groom’s ownership of assets, groom’s level of education and bride’s level of 
education have a significant effect on the value of mahr supports the hypothesis that the 
socioeconomic status of a groom matters (Habibi, 1997). This is also in line with previous 
findings that ownership of assets and level of education affect the value of dowry in 
Pakistan and India (Anderson, 2000; Dalmia & Lawrence, 2005; Murat, 2013). The fact that 
groom’s income, groom’s and bride’s employment status, groom’s and bride’s age, and 
groom’s and bride’s ethnicity do not have a robust significant effect on the value mahr, 
however, qualifies that the relationship between socioeconomic status and the value of 
mahr is not the same for all forms of socioeconomic status. 
 
In contrast to the theoretical prediction (Habibi, 1997), perceived probability of divorce –
as represented by differences in in education level, age and ethnicity of a marrying 
couple– does not have a significant effect on the value of mahr. Perhaps, it is due to 
overoptimism among parental families of the marrying couple regarding the stability of 
their marriage, making the perceived probability of divorce slender. 
 
Finally, the facts that body proportionality does not have a significant effect on the value 
of mahr and that the effect of bride’s height is not robust to sample or subsample 
composition lend no support to the hypothesis that physical appearances matter. This is 
consistent with previous finding (Habibi, 1997) that body proportionality and height are 





This paper analyzes the factors that determine the value of mahr in the marriage of 
Muslims. It uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions covering a sample of 951 groom-
and-bride couples from the last three waves of the Indonesian Family Life Surveys (IFLS).  
 
The main finding is that socioeconomic status in the forms of groom’s ownership of assets 
and groom’s education level matter most for the value of mahr. This holds for all 
regression scenarios, i.e. regressions with full sample, with a subsample of couples whose 
groom belongs to Javanese ethnicity, with a subsample of couples whose groom belongs 
to non-Javanese ethnicity, with a subsample of couples whose bride belongs to Javanese 
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ethnicity and with a subsample of couples whose bride belongs to non-Javanese ethnicity. 
Socioeconomic status in the form of bride’s education level matters, with exceptions for 
regression that includes couples whose bride is Javanese. Socioeconomic status in the 
forms of groom’s income, groom’s employment status and bride’s employment status do 
not have a significant effect on the value mahr. Perceived risk of divorce as represented 
by differences in the socioeconomic status of a marrying couple do not have a significant 
effect on the value of mahr. The effect of physical appearances in the form of body 
proportionality do not have a significant effect on the value of mahr, while the effect of 
physical appearances in the form of bride’s height is at best not robust and subject to the 
sample or subsample included.  
 
The finding in this paper can be useful as a reference to help future grooms and brides to 
make decisions related to their marriage, particularly decisions on the value of mahr to 
offer or to demand. The finding in this paper can also be useful to help Muslim societies 
in general to evaluate the ongoing practices and anticipate possible reforms.  
 
While best effort has been made to ensure the validity of the current research, further 
examination is needed. Perhaps by expanding the number and diversity of marrying 
couples in the sample, improving the measurement of the value of mahr, or using better 
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